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Increased use of the Internet and the growth of electronic commerce within the 
Department of Defense (DoD) has led to the development and implementation of the 
DoD Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).  Any PKI can only serve its intended purpose if 
there is trust within the system.  This thesis reviews the basics of public (or asymmetric) 
key cryptography and its counterpart, symmetric key cryptography.  It outlines the DoD’s 
PKI implementation plan and the user roles identified within the infrastructure.  Because 
a PKI relies entirely on trust, training for all users of a PKI is essential.  The current 
approach to PKI training within the DoD will not provide all of its users with the required 
level of understanding of the system as a whole, or of the implications and ramifications 
that their individual actions may have upon the system.  The decentralized, segmented, 
and inconsistent approach to PKI training will result in a lack of trust within the PKI.  
Training for the DoD PKI must be consistent, current, appropriate, and available to all 
users at any time.  The author proposes a web-based training framework for the DoD 
PKI.  The basic requirements and design of the framework are presented, and a prototype 
is developed for further testing and evaluation.  Without the proper attention to training, 
the DoD PKI will be at risk, and may not perform its intended functions of providing the 
required authenticity and integrity across the various networks upon which DoD conducts 
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 The Internet brings information to one’s fingertips and closes the distance of 
geographical separation.  As the use of the Internet has grown in the personal and 
commercial sectors, it has also grown within the Department of Defense.  Electronic 
commerce and business to business transactions have become more commonplace and 
have highlighted the need for additional security measures when operating over the 
Internet.  The security measures required vary from user to user, but the Department of 
Defense (DoD) realized the need for a way of verifying both the identity of Internet 
operators as well as the information being sent across the network.  In an attempt to meet 
this need, the implementation of a DoD Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) was planned.  
This thesis explains the basics of a Public Key Infrastructure, how it differs from 
conventional or symmetric key cryptography, and how the DoD is implementing and will 
continue to implement the use of a PKI within its ranks.  
Problems with PKI resemble those faced when making any organizational change 
that involves modifying the work patterns and behaviors of employees.  Additionally, the 
implementation of a PKI, by its very nature, is a difficult technical challenge.  The strict 
trust requirements of a PKI together with the current inventory of DoD personnel makes 
the effective implementation of a DoD PKI a very challenging task.  A key factor in the 
success of this implementation is the ability to provide the appropriate level of training to 
the appropriate personnel at the appropriate time.  This is a challenge that, in this author’s 
opinion, is currently on a crash course with failure.  The current approach to providing 
user training at all levels will fall far short of the coordinated, consistent effort needed to 
provoke the desired result.  What is the desired result?  A DoD PKI with users who fully 
understand the implications and ramifications of their actions upon the system, and are 
properly trained to know what they need to do to ensure the ongoing trust of the system.  
With millions of users involved, this is a grand task indeed.  The human element of any 
security system is most often its weakest link.  Regarding its PKI, the DoD should be 
taking all the steps it can to ensure that it strengthens this weakest link as much as 
possible.  No system is perfect, and even educated users will make mistakes, but to not 
attack the issue of user training aggressively is a precursor to failure. 
1 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
The current, segmented approach to PKI training within the Department of 
Defense will not provide the users with the required level of understanding and 
knowledge to effectively and safely use the DoD PKI.  Because a PKI, by its very nature, 
relies on the element of trust, proper training of all users of the PKI is a key factor to the 
success of the PKI.  Even with adequate training, users, most often the weakest link in 
any security chain, must be expected to make mistakes.  Human beings are not perfect.  
The challenge comes in ensuring that the users recognize the implications and 
ramifications of their actions on the system as a whole and have been properly trained in 
how to handle circumstances in which errors were made. 
B. RELATED WORK 
This thesis deals with PKI, training requirements, and the development of a web-
based training framework.  Each of these areas has been researched and written about 
individually.   
The PKI, although a fairly new technology, has a growing list of resources 
including books by Austin, and Adams and Lloyd.  Austin (2001) stresses the need for 
fortification of information technology and reminds us that the whole system is only as 
strong as its weakest link.  He also identifies the need to have resources underlying 
policies to support enforcement and provide education to users.  Adams and Lloyd (1999) 
acknowledge the lack of experienced personnel in the area of PKI.  They state that, 
although this deficit appears to be shrinking, organizations must recognize the need for 
more than a couple of administrators to run a successful PKI.  They also believe that, 
“…it may be beneficial to institute internal training programs…to help educate the 
appropriate personnel” (p. 269).  These authors clearly indicate the requirement for 
training when implementing a PKI. 
On the topic of training, Hall (1998) presents a ‘manual’ on training management 
systems.  He discusses what these systems are, the different types of systems available, 
and what these systems do.  He presents numerous examples of how the different systems 
are being used and provides a detailed review of several existing training management 
systems.  His point of having a consolidated system that can manage not only the training 
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itself, but the completion of training by individuals, is consistent with the DOD PKI 
training framework proposed in this thesis. 
Berge (2001) focuses on the task of integrating distance training and education 
into a company.  He addresses the current role distance training plays in business today 
and provides a model for organizations to use for successful incorporation of this type of 
learning.  One area in which Berge (2001) identifies the use of distance training is to 
assist organizations in meeting the challenges of uncommon change  (i.e. mergers or 
mandates beyond the direct control of the organization).  This is precisely the situation 
that the users of the DOD PKI find themselves in. 
Gery (1987) addresses the topic of computer-based training.  This earlier work 
takes on the issues involved with computer-based training including interactivity, 
sponsorship, management, strategy, technology, development, standards, roles, and 
evaluation.  Many of the obstacles of computer-based training carry over to web-based 
training.  Although technology has advanced since the writing of Gery’s book, many of 
the difficulties she discussed remain. 
A variety of research has been done specifically on the development of web-based 
training.  Driscoll, Alden, and Steed all provide techniques on evaluating the applicability 
of web-based training in a particular situation, list effective and ineffective attributes of 
web-based training sites, and detail a process for developing a web-based training site.  
The work of these authors is utilized in chapter five of this thesis. 
C. A TRAINING FRAMEWORK 
This thesis will focus on the training of potential and existing users of the DoD 
PKI.  It will discuss the current training efforts and why they are not adequate to support 
the level of trust required even within the lowest levels of trust defined in the DoD PKI.  
The author will present an argument for web-based PKI training and will develop an 
overall framework within which this training could be provided to all who need it via 
existing DoD networks, hardware, and software.  The product of this thesis will be a 
prototype of this PKI training framework that will demonstrate the basic functionality 
required of such a system.  The goal is to provide a foundation on which an actual PKI 
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training system can be built.  This will allow for the most efficient distribution of the 
most current training to widely dispersed users.  
D. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
 This thesis contains six chapters and two appendices as follows. 
 Chapter I: Introduction – This chapter introduces the topic of the DoD PKI and 
identifies the need for appropriate training of the system’s users. 
 Chapter II: Public Key Cryptography and Public Key Infrastructure – This chapter 
provides a basic overview of both symmetric and asymmetric (public key) cryptography 
and some implications of their use. 
 Chapter III: Department of Defense Public Key Infrastructure Implementation – 
This chapter outlines the organization of and the implementation plans for a PKI within 
the DoD. 
 Chapter IV: User Role Descriptions and Responsibilities – This chapter presents 
outlines the common users roles within any PKI and specifies the roles identified within 
the DoD PKI. 
 Chapter V:  Training for the DoD PKI – This chapter identifies the need for 
training, presents the current training efforts, and introduces the idea for a web-based PKI 
training framework. 
 Chapter VI:  Conclusion – This chapter summarizes the main ideas of the 
previous chapters and lists areas for continued research and work on this topic. 
 Appendix A:  Database Design and Modeling – This is a basic overview of the 
database design and modeling techniques used in the development of the DoD PKI 
training database. 
 Appendix B:  DoD PKI Training Framework Prototype – This is a compilation of 
screen shots from the DoD PKI Training Framework prototype. 
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II. PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY AND PUBLIC KEY 
INFRASTRUCTURE  
Cryptography is an integral part of a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).  This 
chapter presents a general overview of cryptography, what it is, what communication 
protection services it provides, and the two types of cryptography that can be utilized.  
An introduction to PKI and its components follows. 
 
A. CRYPTOGRAPHY 
Cryptography involves the study of mathematical techniques and their application 
to certain aspects of information technology (Menezes, van Oorschot, and Vanstone, 
1996).  Cryptography is about preventing and detecting cheating or other malicious 
activities that may occur within an information system (Menezes et al, 1996).  
Cryptosystems provide four main services for communications protection – secrecy (or 
confidentiality), authenticity, integrity, and non-repudiation.  Secrecy (or confidentiality), 
the original purpose of cryptosystems, requires that intruders are not able to determine the 
plain text message corresponding to a given cipher text, and that key reconstruction 
cannot be performed by examining cipher text for known plain text.  Authenticity allows 
a receiver to verify the source of a message.  Integrity allows a user to ensure that a 
message has not been modified accidentally or deliberately during transmission.  Non-
repudiation prevents a sender from later denying transmission of a message.  
Cryptosystems utilize keys to encrypt (encode) and decrypt (decode) messages.  Two two 
types of cryptosystems can be used: symmetric key or public key (Austin, 2001). Austin 
provides the following summary of these essential services: 
• Confidentiality assures you that your information is protected. 
• Authentication assures you that you know with whom you’re doing business. 
• Integrity assures you that information is not being modified or substituted. 
• Non-repudiation assures you that the originator cannot deny originating a 
message or business transaction. (Austin, 2001, p. xv) 
 
B. CONVENTIONAL (SYMMETRIC) KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY 
In symmetric key cryptography, a message is encrypted and decrypted with the 
same key.  See Figure 2.1. 
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 Figure 2.1 Symmetric Cryptography (From Morris, 2001, p. 5) 
 
This requires that both the sender and the receiver possess the same key.  Symmetric key 
encryption requires that the parties involved keep the key secret.  If the key is 
compromised, it can no longer be used.  Because this type of encryption requires that 
keys be distributed securely, it has several limitations (Adams and Lloyd, 1999). Key 
distribution and key management becomes much more difficult as the population of users 
grows, it is difficult to initiate communications between unknown parties, and 
confidentiality between specific parties requires separate keys (Morris, 2001).  A 
mechanism for updating keys must also be in place, as the same key cannot be used 
indefinitely. 
C. PUBLIC (ASYMMETRIC) KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY 
Public key cryptography provides the same services as symmetric key 
cryptography in general, but it uses different keys for encryption and decryption.  A key 
pair in a public key cryptography scheme consists of a private key and a public key.  
These key pairs are generated by a process that ensures the keys are uniquely paired with 
one another and that neither key can be determined from the other (Hale and Friedrichs, 
2000).   
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Figure 2.2 Asymmetric Encryption (From Morris, 2001, p. 7) 
 
Each entity in a public key system will be assigned a private key and a public key.  
Private keys are kept private, and public keys are published and accessible to anyone 
(www.iplanet.com, 2000).  The process of sending a message using a public key system 
is as follows: 
• Alice wants to send a message to Bob so that Bob is the only one who can 
read the message (confidentiality). 
• Alice has Bob’s public key. 
• Alice encrypts the message with Bob’s public key. 
• Alice sends the encrypted message to Bob. 
• Bob uses his private key to decrypt the message. 
In this scheme, Bob, who is in sole possession of Bob’s private key, is the only one who 
will be able to decrypt this message.  If the message is intercepted during transmission, 
the interceptor will not be able to decrypt it.  This process is described in general in 
Figure 2.3. 
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 Figure 2.3 Asymmetric Encryption (Confidentiality) (From Morris, 2001, p. 8) 
 
The reverse of this scenario is also utilized for signing messages with a digital signature.  
A digital signature is an electronic document that describes the holder 
(www.id2tech.com, 2000).  The recipient of a digitally signed message, having the public 
key of the signer, can determine 1) if the message was created with the signer’s private 
key, and 2) if the message has been altered since it was signed (ASD Memo, 2000).  
Digital signatures provide authentication, non-repudiation, and integrity checks.  In a 
public key system, encrypting a message with a private key is effectively signing the 
message since only one person has the private key (Austin, 2001).  When using a digital 
signature, the data itself is not encrypted, but a hash of the data is encrypted with a 
private key.  A hash is a number of fixed length such that 1) the value of the hash is 
unique for the hashed data and any change in the data results in a different value, and 2) 
the content of the hashed data cannot be deduced from the hash itself (resulting in the use 
of the term “one-way hash”).  Figure 2.4 illustrates the use of a digital signature. 
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Figure 2.4 Digital Signing (Authentication, Integrity, Non-repudiation) (From 
Morris, 2001, p. 9) 
 
In Figure 2.4, the data and the digital signature are sent to the recipient.  The digital 
signature is simply a one-way hash of the original data that has been encrypted with the 
signer’s private key.  To validate the data, the recipient uses the signer’s public key to 
decrypt the digital signature and obtain the hash.  The original data is then run through 
the same hashing algorithm that generated the original hash.  Information about the 
hashing algorithm is actually included with the digital signature (although it is not shown 
in the figure).  This new hash is compared to the original hash to verify that the data has 
not been changed since it was signed. (www.iplanet.com, 2000) 
 Public key encryption and digital signatures are often combined to provide all 
four services (confidentiality, authentication, integrity, and non-repudiation). In this 
situation, a message is signed with the sender’s private key and the recipient’s public key. 
This ensures that only the intended recipient will be able to read the message, and that the 






Figure 2.5 Digital Signing and Encrypting (From Morris, 2001, p. 10) 
  
This seems, on the surface, to be a valid method of ensuring integrity of data and 
authenticating the sender.  However; how can the receiver be certain that a digital 
signature is valid?  An imposter could substitute his or her public key for someone else’s, 
and the receiving party would not be able to tell the difference.  In order for public key 
encryption to be valid, a level of trust must exist within the system.  This trust is 
established through the use of certificates and Certification Authorities within a public 
key infrastructure. 
D. PUBLIC KEY INFRASTURCTURE COMPONENTS 
1. What is a Public Key Infrastructure? 
A Public Key Infrastructure has many definitions. The following list provides a 
sample of some of these definitions. 
From Morris (2001, p. 15), a PKI is “…personnel, policy, procedures, 
components and facilities to enable public key cryptographic functions so that 
applications can provide the desired security services.” 
From Green (2001, p. 3), a PKI is “personnel, policy, procedures, components and 
facilities to bind user names to electronic keys so that applications can provide the 
desired security services.” 
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From DoD Class 3 PKI CONOPS (1999, p. 2-5), a PKI is “…that portion of the 
security management infrastructure dedicated to the management of keys and certificates 
used by public key-based security services.” 
Essentially, a PKI includes all the components required to establish and maintain 
the trust relationship and the binding of a public key to its owner within a system 
providing public key-based applications.  “Most important is the fact that with IT 
security, just as with military security or castle fortification, security is only as good as its 
weakest components.” (Austin, 2001, pp. 23-24) 
2. Primary PKI Elements 
A Public Key Infrastructure is comprised of 3 basic elements or processes. These 
are 1) certificate management, 2) the registration process, and 3) public key-enabled 
applications. Within these elements are various components.  These components can be 
broken down into people, hardware, and policies. (Morris, 2001) 
The people component can be broken down into various roles.  These roles 
include the Certification Authority (CA) – who creates and signs public key certificates, 
the Registration Authority (RA) – who authorizes the creation of a certificate and 
provides information to the CA, the Subscriber (or end user) – who requests certificates 
and uses keys in applications, and the Relying Parties – the applications and users who 
trust the certificates. (Morris, 2001)  
The hardware components of a PKI include the Repository (or Directory) – the 
device used to store and retrieve public key certificates, keys, and revocation information 
(Morris, 2001), workstations, firewalls, routers, and servers (Galik, 2000).  Workstations, 
firewalls, routers, and servers are examples of non-human entities that may be subscribers 
to a PKI (Galik, 2000).  The specific guidelines regarding these types of subscribers are 
described in the PKI policies. 
Policies are those documents which define the rules and processes of the PKI 
system (Galik, 2000).  Within these policy documents are the levels of assurance that will 
be required (Galik, 2000).  The assurance levels defined for the DoD PKI are defined in 
Chapter III. 
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E. CERTIFICATES AND CERTIFICATION AUTHORITIES 
Certificates and Certification Authorities are used in a public key encryption 
system to build confidence into the system.  A Certification Authority (CA) verifies the 
authenticity of a public key.  CAs produce identity certificates that include an 
individual’s public key.  For example, an identity certificate for Alice would include 
Alice’s name, the name of the CA that issued the certificate, Alice’s public key, a period 
of validity, a serial number, and additional technical parameters (www.iplanet.com, 
2000).  The trusted CA then signs the certificate with its private key.  Now the certificate 
can be published and used by other individuals doing business with Alice with the 
confidence of knowing that the CA has verified that the public key truly belongs to Alice 
(Hale, 1999).  In effect, the identity certificate binds Alice’s identity to her public key, 
but how does the CA know that it is really Alice’s public key being signed?  In order to 
obtain the necessary information to create Alice’s certificate, another trusted entity called 
the Registration Authority (RA) is involved.  The RA is an intermediary between Alice 
and the CA.  The RA is responsible for identifying Alice and authorizing her to get a 
certificate.  Working together, Alice, the RA, and the CA verify Alice’s identity and 
public key, issue Alice’s identity certificate, and ensure that Alice, and only Alice, 
possesses the matching private key. (Hale, 1999)   
Several certificate formats exist, but the most widely accepted format is that of the 
X.509 standard.  The International Telecommunication Union (ITU-T) developed the 
X.509 standard in 1988.  A second version of the standard was released in 1993, and it 
included additional fields.  The structure of version two was determined to be too 
restrictive, and it was replaced by version three in 1996. (java.sun.com, 1998)  Refer to 
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 for details on the X.509 v3 certificate standard. 
12 
 Version (of Certificate Format) 
Certificate Serial Number 
Signature Algorithm Identifier (for CA’s Signature) 
Issuer (Certification Authority) X.500 Name 
Validity Period (Start and Expiration Date/Times) 
Subject Name (X.500 Name) 
Subject Public Key Information 
 
 
Issuer Unique Identifier 
Subject Unique Identifier 
 
Extension Type Critical/Non-critical Extension Field Value 
Certification Authority’s Digital Signature 
Algorithm Identifier 
Public Key Value 
Table 2.1 X.509 v3 Certificate Format (After Gaines, p. 83) 
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 Element Description 
Version This lists the version of the certificate that 
is being used. In most cases this will be 
version 3. 
Serial number An integer value assigned by the CA that 
uniquely identifies the certificate. 
Signature algorithm identifier This field identifies the algorithm used to 
digitally sign the certificate and any related 
parameters. 
Issuer name X.500 name of the CA that created and 
signed the certificate. 
Validity period This field lists the start and expiration dates 
of the certificate. 
Subject name This is the name of the entity that 
corresponds to the public key. Previous 
versions only allowed X.500 names, but 
version 3 allows additional naming 
formats. 
Subject public key information This field lists the algorithm, parameters 
and public key of the entity in the subject 
name field. 
Issuer unique identifier This is an optional field that contains 
additional information about the CA. 
Subject unique identifier This field is optional and contains 
additional information about the subject to 
ensure name collisions do not occur. 
Extensions This field is optional. X.509 v3 supports 
numerous extension fields depending on 
the applications’ need. 
Issuer’s signature This field contains the algorithm identifier, 
parameters and the certificate hash signed 
by the CA’s private key. 
Table 2.2 X.509 v3 Certificate Elements (After Gaines, p. 83-84) 
 
In addition to the Identity Certificate, which provides for authentication, non-
repudiation, and integrity, there are several other certificate types.  All certificate types 
are described briefly in the following table. 
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Certificate Type Services Provided 
Identity Authentication, non-repudiation, integrity 
Email Signing (encryption) Authentication, non-repudiation, integrity 
Server/Device Web server authentication, encryption via SSL 
Table 2.3 Certificate Types (After Morris, 2001, p. 24) 
 
F. PROTECTION OF PRIVATE KEYS 
CAs provide verification of an individual’s public key, but the other half of public 
key encryption, the private key, introduces additional problems into a public key system.  
The protection of private keys is essential in a public key encryption system.  A private 
key is tied to one individual, and, if this tie is broken, the public/private key pair issued 
becomes invalid.  Two options for storing private keys are: software encryption or the use 
of a token.  Software encryption will protect a private key as long as the password to 
access the key is not compromised.  This type of protection may be appropriate when a 
computer has a single user and has some level of physical isolation from others (i.e. – an 
office door with a lock).  A token is a device that is used for protection and transportation 
of private keys of a user.  These can be floppy disks, smart cards, common access cards, 
PC cards, or others (ASD Memo, 2000).  Tokens allow more flexibility in that the private 
key is not simply stored on one computer, but it is mobile and does not rely on the use of 
the same computer all the time.  These may be appropriate when multiple users share the 
same computer or when individuals have a need to travel and use their private keys in a 
variety of locations.  Hale and Friedrichs (2000) note that there is currently widespread 
storage of private keys in an encrypted file accessed only via password, but that there will 
be a move, within the Department of Defense, toward some type of hardware token.  It is 
expected that the Common Access Card (CAC) will become the primary token for class 3 
and 4 PKI certification levels (ASD Memo, 2000).  If a private key is lost or 
compromised, the PKI must support the notification of its users that a particular key pair 
is no longer valid and should not be used or trusted.  This notification is conducted via 
the use of Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs).  CRLs are discussed in more detail in the 
following section.  All of the user roles within a PKI system must act promptly as soon as 
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a private key is lost or compromised so that the system can remain as up to date and 
trustworthy as possible.  Proper training must be provided to ensure that all users have an 
understanding of what to do and when to do it. 
G. CERTIFICATE REVOCATION LISTS 
A public/private key pair becomes unusable if the private key is lost or 
compromised.  When this occurs, there must be procedures in place to notify all potential 
users of the public key encryption system that the public key is no longer valid. This is 
normally done through a Certificate Revocation List (CRL).  A CRL is generated, signed, 
and published by a CA.  The process normally occurs as follows: 
• Alice is issued a public/private key pair. 
• A CA creates, signs, and publishes a certificate containing Alice’s public key. 
• Alice loses her private key and notifies the RA that initially authorized her to 
obtain the certificate. If the RA is not available, Alice may contact the CA 
directly to report the loss of her private key. 
• The RA notifies the CA that issued Alice’s certificate that her private key has 
been lost. 
• The CA adds Alice’s certificate to its CRL, which is signed and published at 
frequent intervals. 
Ensuring that the information in a PKI directory is current and trustworthy is crucial to 
the trustworthiness of the PKI system as a whole.  The procedures in place within the 
system and the practices followed by users at all levels will determine the degree to 
which the system can and should be trusted.   
Loss or compromise of a private key is not the only reason that a certificate may 
have to be revoked.  A certificate will be revoked if any of the information it contains is 
no longer valid.  Because of this, it is important that a certificate contain only information 
that is unlikely to change frequently.  Any compromise in the certificate issuing or 
maintenance process will also necessitate the revocation of a certificate (Hale, 1999). 
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H. KEY ESCROW, KEY RECOVERY, AND DATA RECOVERY 
Key escrow, key recovery, and data recovery are used to support obtaining access 
to information protected by a public key system in which the originator of the data is 
unable or unwilling to provide access.  Key escrow involves copying and storing 
confidentiality (or encryption) private keys for use in predefined situations.  When one of 
these situations occurs, the private key can be recovered and used to access any 
information that was encrypted with the key.  Situations in which data and key recovery 
may be required include an employee forgetting the password required to unlock an 
encrypted file, the loss of a hardware token containing the key required to unlock an 
encrypted file, or the death of an employee who had stored encrypted information.  Key 
escrow and recovery must exist in order for data recovery to occur.  Systems for key 
escrow and recovery must provide a secure method of storing the copy of a user’s private 
encryption key.  Authorized key recovery agents are allowed to retrieve a copy of a user’s 
key under certain conditions.  Once the key is recovered, the encrypted data can be 
accessed.  Key and data recovery are used for encryption keys only.  User’s private 
signature keys are not recoverable. (DoD Class 3 PKI CONOPS, 1999) (SPAWAR, 
2000) 
I. VULNERABILITIES AND CHALLENGES OF PUBLIC KEY 
CRYPTOGRAPHY AND THE PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE 
The success of public key cryptography relies on many factors.  A successful and 
trustworthy PKI, at a minimum, relies on the process of issuing certificates, the protection 
of individual private keys, the protection of the CA’s private key, and the accuracy and 
timeliness of CRLs.  Because the system is a chain, if any one of these links fail, the 
system fails.  It is vital to a PKI system that all of these links, including human links, be 
reinforced, to the highest degree possible, to maintain the level of security required.  The 
integrity of this chain is one of many challenges that come with implementing a public 
key infrastructure.  Other challenges include training, ease of use, interoperability, 
scalability, and key escrow processes (Morris, 2001) (Galik, 2000).  Some safeguards that 
can be put in place in a PKI system are policies to ensure consistent procedures for 
issuing certificates, checks and balances to provide internal and external reviews and 
audits, and, arguably the most important safeguard, a comprehensive, role-specific, 
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timely training program (Hale, 1999).  For the Department of Defense, the critical factors 
for a successful PKI implementation will include flexibility, coordination, and training 
(Morris, 2001). 
Chapter III will delineate the Department of Defense plans for implementing a 
PKI.  The DoD PKI will be one part of the overlapping layers of protection of the overall 
Defense in Depth strategy.  The planned DoD PKI organization, assurance levels, 
services, and architecture will be discussed. 
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III. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PUBLIC KEY 
INFRASTRUCTURE IMPLEMENTATION 
The Department of Defense has recognized the need for a PKI, and it has laid out 
plans for its implementation.  This chapter provides an overview of how a PKI fits into 
the overall DoD information assurance posture and the DoD PKI implementation strategy 
as a whole. 
A. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INFORMATION ASSURANCE 
The Department of Defense utilizes an Information Assurance policy called 
Defense in Depth.  This policy requires the implementation of multiple layers of 
overlapping protection for information systems.  This overlapping system of defense is 
designed to protect DoD assets and assure successful mission execution.  A graphical 
representation of this Defense in Depth strategy is contained in Figure 3.1 below. 
 
Figure 3.1 Department of Defense – Defense in Depth (From Green, 2001, p. 26) 
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 The Defense in Depth strategy relies on the use of a  
…common, integrated, interoperable DoD PKI to enable security services 
at multiple levels of assurance.  The goal of this DoD-wide infrastructure 
is to provide general-purpose PKI services to a broad range of 
applications, at levels of assurance, consistent with operational 
imperatives. (ASD Memo, 2000, p. 2) 
The implementation of PKI technology within the DoD is a large, complex 
and challenging task and is essential for achieving our defense in depth 
goals. (Galik, 2000, p. 6) 
 
B. DOD PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE ORGANIZATION 
On August 12, 2000, the DoD Chief Information Officer (CIO) issued a 
memorandum issuing and updating policies regarding the development and 
implementation of a DoD PKI (ASD Memo, 2000).  The National Security Agency 
(NSA) has been assigned as the Program Manager for the DoD PKI effort with a Deputy 
Program Manager provided by the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) (Galik, 
2000).  The following chart shows the organization of the DoD PKI Program 
Management Office as of January 2001: 
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Figure 3.2 DoD PKI PMO Organization (From Green, 2001, p. 12) 
The DoD CIO’s memorandum also included a delineation of responsibilities for 
certain key individuals and offices regarding the implementation of the DoD PKI.  The 
DoD CIO is responsible for management of the Defense-wide Information Assurance 
Program (DIAP) which includes providing oversight of DoD PKI activities, developing 
PKI planning guidance, providing guidance on PKI implementation and integration, and 
study technical issues regarding PKI-enabled access to classified DoD networks and 
classified private web servers. (ASD Memo, 2000) 
The DoD Components (The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military 
Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commands, the 
Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies and Offices, and 
the DoD field activities) are responsible for  
…planning, programming, and budgeting to implement the DoD PKI 
according to this policy and to develop the required policy and plans to 
ensure a standard implementation of the DoD PKI within their respective 
organizations…” (ASD Memo, 2000, p. 5) 
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These high-level responsibilities filter down ultimately to the CAs, RAs, LRAs, 
and users of the DoD PKI.  The identification of the various roles within the DoD PKI 
and their responsibilities is contained in Chapter IV. 
C. PKI CERTIFICATION/ASSURANCE LEVELS 
A PKI assurance level is the degree of confidence one can place in the binding the 
PKI creates between a person and his or her private key (Hale and Friedrichs, 2000).  The 
Department of Defense has defined four different levels of assurance regarding PKI and 
explained the circumstances under which three of these levels will be implemented.  
These levels are defined in Appendix C of the Public Key Infrastructure Roadmap for the 
Department of Defense (DoD PKI PMO, 1999). 
1. Class 3: (Formerly Medium) 
This level is intended for applications handling medium value information 
in a low to medium risk environment. This assurance level is appropriate 
for applications that require identification of an entity as a legal person, 
rather than merely a member of an organization. This assurance level 
requires that the end user register in person and their cryptography can be 
software based. (DoD PKI PMO, 1999, p. C-1) 
 
2. Class 4: (Formerly High) 
This level is intended for applications handling medium to high value 
information in any environment. These applications typically require 
identification of an entity as a legal person rather than merely a member of 
an organization and a cryptographic hardware token for protection of the 
private key material. This level requires a hardware token for protection of 
private key material, and that the end user register in person. (DoD PKI 
PMO, 1999, p. C-1) 
 
3. Class 5 
This level is intended for applications handling high value information in a 
high-risk environment. This assurance level requires National Security 




D. DOD PKI SERVICES 
In order to support the security services required by a PKI, the DoD PKI will 
provide the following services (DoD PKI CONOPS, 1999): 
1. Key Generation 
This is the process of generating the key pairs – one public and one private that 
will enable public key functionality. 
2. Certificate Generation 
This is the process of issuing a certificate after a key pair has been generated. This 
process may be combined with the key generation process, or it may be requested by 
users who generate their own key pairs.  When requested by a user, a registration process 
must be completed in which the user provides the required information to a CA, and the 
CA creates a certificate and signs it with the CA’s private key.  The requirements for this 
registration process are established in the CA’s Certification Practice Statement.  These 
requirements are essential to the PKI system because it is this certificate that will provide 
the trusted binding between a key pair and its owner. 
3. Certificate Revocation 
Certificate revocation is required when a certificate becomes invalid, for any of 
several reasons, prior to its expiration date.  Some of these reasons include compromise 
of the private key (through loss or deception), or when any of the information contained 
in the certificate is no longer valid.  It is for this reason that the information used in the 
certificate should be of the type that does not change frequently.  This will lessen the 
need to revoke and reissue certificates more frequently than absolutely necessary to 
protect the integrity of the PKI. 
4. Certificate Expiration, Update, and Rekeying 
Certificate expiration is a built-in mechanism for limiting the life of a certificate.  
This limit is imposed to help protect the key against compromise and ensure that the 
information in the certificate remains current. Owners of certificates must obtain new 
certificates prior to the expiration of their current certificates in order to avoid a 
disruption in service.  This can be accomplished through updating or rekeying a 
certificate.  This process is very similar to the process of generating a key pair for the first 
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time except that the owner utilizes his or her current key pair to authenticate themselves 
to the CA during the registration process.  The registration process is repeated to ensure 
that the owner’s need for the certificate still exists. 
5. Archiving 
Archives must be maintained so that signatures on old documents may be verified 
even after the CA that issued the certificate used to sign the document is gone.  These 
long-term repositories must archive certificates that have been issued, certificate 
revocation lists, and user registration information.  
 
E. DOD PKI CA ARCHITECTURE 
The goal for the DoD PKI architecture is to employ centralized certificate 
management with decentralized registration.  Figure 3.3 displays the target DoD PKI CA 






















Figure 3.3 Target DoD PKI CA Architecture (From DoD PKI PMO, 1999, p. 7) 
The main levels of this architecture, as shown in Figure 3.3, are the centralized Root CA 
and DoD CAs, and the decentralized RAs, LRAs, and DoD Users.  These specific roles 
are described in detail in Chapter IV.  Additional entities of the DoD PKI include a Data 
Recovery Manager (DRM), CRL Archive Servers, Directories, Archives, and Certificate 
Status Servers. (DoD Class 3 PKI CONOPS, 1999) 
 A Data Recovery Manager (DRM) allows for the recovery of a user’s key. The 
circumstances in which the DRM may be used to recover a key include those 
circumstances listed in Chapter II under Key Escrow, Key Recovery, and Data Recovery 
and may also be authorized by a user’s Commanding Officer under additional 
circumstances.  These circumstances are not spelled out in detail, but it is assumed that 
they may include instances in which illegal activity is suspected.  The DoD PKI version 2 
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will employ a central team of key recovery agents to perform this function. (DoD Class 3 
PKI CONOPS, 1999) 
 A CRL Archive Server allows a user to verify a digital signature by providing 
long-term storage and retrieval of CRLs.  This is required to obtain verification of old 
messages or documents that were signed using a certificate that has since expired.  The 
verification of these certificates must be done by accessing the CRL Archive Server and 
checking the CRL that was in effect at the time that the signature was made. (DoD Class 
3 PKI CONOPS, 1999) 
 Directories are those entities of a PKI that store information about users and their 
certificates.  Directories are maintained by CA’s who post certificates to the directory 
upon their creation.  Directories are where users of a PKI  gain access to the public keys  
and  certificates of other users.  Directories also store CRLs so that a determination of 
validity can be made regarding an inquiry on any certificate posted to the directory. (DoD 
Class 3 PKI CONOPS, 1999)  The target DoD PKI architecture calls for a common 
“…DoD-wide directory to support all DoD public key enabled applications.” (DoD PKI 
PMO, 1999, p. 9) 
 Archives contain the weekly backup copies of CA system configuration files 
(archived at initialization), certificates, CRLs, weekly audit logs, and any modifications 
to the CA system configuration files.  These archives will be maintained for 10 years and 
6 months. (DoD Class 3 PKI CONOPS, 1999) 
 An Online Certificate Status Server enables the real time or near real time 
determination of the validity of a certificate by querying a dedicated server.  The protocol 
used for this is the Online Certificate Status Protocol.  (DoD Class 3 PKI CONOPS, 
1999) 
F. DOD PKI STRATEGY AND MILESTONES 
The Department of Defense has defined a strategy for implementing its PKI and 
has defined the following milestones (approved 12 August 2000): 
• December 2000 – private web servers will be PKI-enabled 
• December 2001 – the complete class 3 infrastructure will be in place 
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• October 2002 – all DoD personnel will be issued class 3 certificates 
• October 2002 – all DoD e-mail must be signed with al class 3 certificate 
• October 2002 – all private web servers must perform client-side 
authentication 
• October 2002 – the issuance of class 4 certificates will begin 
• December 2003 – migration of mission critical systems from class 3 to 
class 4 protection (Green, 2001) 
G. DOD PKI TRAINING 
Based on the Public Key Infrastructure Roadmap for the Department of Defense,  
CINCs, Services, and Agencies that operate PKI equipment will acquire 
appropriate training for their operators on the policy and proper use of the 
equipment.  The Program Management Office, working with the Services, 
will develop the training material for any equipment that they develop. 
(DoD PKI PMO, 1999, p. 22) 
 
Currently, DoD PKI training is handled primarily through the Information 
Assurance Support Environment – supported by the Defense Information Systems 
Agency. This web site provides general information, documents related to PKI, and a 
schedule of PKI training currently being offered.  There is also a DoD PKI Help Desk 
which can be accessed via the Internet or by phone. The help desk provides assistance to 
all DoD PKI users 24 hours a day.  
The training is not currently widely available, and the Help Desk provides only a 
reactive response to problems.  A more comprehensive, widely available training source 
for DoD PKI users needs to be implemented.  In order to provide the required level of 
trust in a PKI, all components must be equally secure.  This includes the human 
components. 
H. CONFIDENTIALITY VS. IDENTITY CERTIFICATES 
 Within the DoD PKI, two types of certificates will be issued and used.  The 
identity certificate uniquely identifies a user while a confidentiality or encryption 
certificate encrypts data. (SPAWAR, 2000) 
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I. KEY ESCROW AND KEY RECOVERY 
The DoD PKI will require key escrow (as explained in Chapter II) for its 
confidentiality or encryption certificates. This will ensure that encrypted data can be 
recovered in the event a person dies, loses their private encryption key, or leaves the 
DoD. (SPAWAR, 2000)  Within the DoD PKI, only the user and the commanding officer 
may request recovery of an escrowed key.  Key recovery is protected by two-person 
integrity, meaning two key recovery agents are needed to recover a key.  The specific 
processes involved in key recovery within the DoD PKI are explained in Chapter V. 
(DoD Class 3 PKI CONOPS, 1999) 
The implementation of a PKI within the DoD is a complex task that will involve 
many people and a significant amount of time and resources. The people involved in the 
implementation and the day-to-day operations of the PKI will serve in various roles with 
various levels of responsibility.  It is important that these responsibilities are well defined 
and well understood.  Chapter IV will discuss the basic human roles in a generic PKI as 
























IV. USER ROLE DESCRIPTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
A PKI relies on the performance of specific tasks by specific entities within the 
system.  Several of these roles are standard and can be found in any PKI.  The DoD 
utilizes these standard roles and some additional roles in its PKI implementation.  This 
chapter describes these roles and their inherent responsibilities.  
A. PKI USER ROLES 
All PKI systems include various types of users.  These users or components of a 
PKI have certain responsibilities that must be fulfilled to assure that the PKI services are 
maintained at the desired level of security.  Adams and Lloyd describe several of the key 
user roles involved in any PKI system and their responsibilities (Adams and Lloyd, 
1999): 
1. Subscriber 
A subscriber is an end-user who acquires a certificate for subsequent use within 
the PKI system. These end-users are obligated to: 
• Make truthful representations in applying for a certificate 
• Review and accept a certificate before using it 
• Make certain representations upon acceptance of the certificate 
• Control and keep confidential the corresponding private key 
• Promptly revoke the certificate upon compromise of the corresponding private 
key (Adams and Lloyd, 1999, p. 192-193) 
 
Upon acceptance of a certificate, a user must verify his or her identity to the agent 
presenting the certificate, and agree to use the certificate as it is intended to be used. 
2. Certification Authority 
A Certification Authority is an independent and trusted third party that certifies 
the binding between and individual and his or her private key (Austin, 2001).  A 
Certification Authority is obligated to: 
• Use a trustworthy system 
• Disclose its practices and procedures 
• Properly identify a prospective applicant for a certificate 
• Publish issued certificates in a repository 
• Suspend and/or revoke certificates 
• Make warranties to the certificate applicant upon issuance of the certificate 
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• Make warranties to persons using the certificate to verify digitally signed 
messages (Adams and Lloyd, 1999, p. 194) 
 
3. Relying Party 
A relying party is the user of a certificate (Austin, 2001).  A relying party’s 
obligations include: 
• Verification of digital signatures from originating subscribers 
• Knowledge of the rules associated with digital signature acceptance 
• Record-keeping to help resolve any disputes that may arise in the future 
• Understanding what to do when things go wrong, and/or when something occurs 
that requires the intervention or action of the relying party (Adams and Lloyd, 
1999, p. 194) 
 
B. DOD PKI USER ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
The Department of Defense has defined similar roles for its PKI.  The following 
sections describe the roles and responsibilities of users and entities within the DoD PKI. 
1. Root Certification Authority 
The Root Certification Authority (RCA) is the source of trust throughout all levels 
of the DoD PKI.  The security of the RCA is paramount, as any compromise of the RCA 
would result in the compromise of the entire underlying PKI.  In order to maintain this 
trust in the RCA and ultimately the entire PKI, the RCA must follow the DoD Certificate 
Practice Statement appropriate to the level of PKI the RCA is operating on.  (DoD Class 
3 PKI CONOPS, 1999) 
The RCA is responsible for establishing subordinate Certification Authorities 
(CAs), establishing security policies for these CAs, generating and signing its own 
certificate, signing the certificates of its CAs, and revoking the certificates of any CAs if 
any degree of compromise is suspected.  The RCA is also responsible for maintaining 
backups of all software, the certificate database, and private keys such that the RCA 
could be rebuilt in the event of a catastrophic failure.  The RCA is responsible for 
ensuring that its subordinate CAs issue updated Certificate Revocation Lists before the 
current ones expire.  (DoD Class 3 PKI CONOPS, 1999) 
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2. Certification Authorities 
Certification Authorities (CAs) are established by and subordinate to the RCA.  
Like the RCA, they play a critical role in the overall trust of the DoD PKI, and they must 
conform to all applicable policies and regulations.  The responsibilities of a CA are 
processing the registration of users, creating and signing user certificates, and 
maintaining CRLs.  These tasks are accomplished by operating and maintaining a CA 
server, and conducting all aspects of certificate management – initial issue, reissue, 
revocation, re-keying, and updating CRLs.  Additionally, like the RCA, each CA must 
maintain backups of software, the certificate database, and private keys in order to 
facilitate a rebuild in case of a catastrophic failure.  (SPAWAR, 1999) 
The CA is another vital link in the trust chain of the DoD PKI. The CA signs the 
certificates of its registered users, and the RCA signs the certificates of its established 
CAs.  This allows the user to prove that he or she is a valid user of the PKI provided that 
the CAs certificate is valid and the RCA has not been compromised.  (DoD Class 3 PKI 
CONOPS, 1999) 
3. Registration Authorities 
Registration Authorities (RAs) act as an interface between the CA and the 
subscribers.  They are also responsible for following all applicable policies and 
regulations regarding the DoD PKI.  RAs verify the identity of users requesting to be 
registered with a CA and to be provided with a public/private key pair.  The RA may 
authenticate users within his or her organization.  This responsibility of user 
authentication may be delegated to a Local Registration Authority (see section 4).  RAs 
have two unique privileges. They can revoke any certificate within their organization, and 
they can revoke certificates of other RAs.  (DoD Class 3 PKI CONOPS, 1999) 
4. Local Registration Authorities 
Local Registration Authorities (LRAs) exist to reduce the workload of an RA and 
to bring the PKI registration service closer to the subscriber.  LRAs are appointed via 
requests to the PKI PMO.  RAs will identify and authenticate an LRA using a 
government issued identification card.  Large organizations may have many LRAs.  
These may be staff personnel with other primary responsibilities, or they may be full-time 
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LRAs.  LRAs are also bound to the DoD PKI policies and regulations and must ensure 
that the users they are registering understand the responsibilities of possessing and using 
a DoD PKI certificate.  LRAs pre-register users during a face-to-face transaction.  After a 
user’s identity has been verified, the LRA generates a Certificate Registration Instruction 
(CRI).  The user follows the steps on the CRI, completes the registration process, and 
obtains his or her key pair and certificate.  LRAs may revoke certificates as requested by 
a certificate owner or the organizations Information System Security Officer (ISSO) (see 
section C3 in this chapter).  (DoD Class 3 PKI CONOPS, 1999) 
5. Trusted Agent 
The Trusted Agent (TA) is an optional role that may be assigned within the DoD 
PKI.  The purpose of a TA is to help reduce the workload of the LRA.  An LRA must 
make a request to the RA to appoint a TA.  When a TA is in use, the LRA will generate a 
CRI for the user, the TA will perform the face-to-face authentication with the user, and 
the TA will distribute the CRI.  A TA must sign a statement of agreement and 
understanding of responsibilities prior to performing these functions.  (DoD Class 3 PKI 
CONOPS, 1999) 
6. User 
The majority of people within the DoD PKI will fall into the role of a User.  The 
User role can be further divided into 3 sub-roles. 
a. Subscriber 
A Subscriber owns the public/private key pair and certificate. A subscriber 
may be a person or a machine.  In the case of a machine, the administrator for the 
machine becomes responsible for the key pair used by the machine.  A Subscriber uses 
the key pair to sign messages, encrypt/decrypt data, and authenticate themselves to other 
users.  The identity of a Subscriber is bound to his or her private key (based on face-to-
face authentication); therefore, the Subscriber must protect all private keys and 
passwords.  The Subscriber is responsible for reporting any possible compromise to the 
RA as soon as it is suspected.  The Subscriber’s certificate contains identity information 
and the public key.  This certificate is signed by the CA in order to carry on the trust link 
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all the way back to the RCA.  This complete flow of trust from the RCA to the User is 
depicted in the following figure. 
 
Figure 4.1 PKI Trust Flow  
 
b. Relying Party 
A Relying Party is the entity that uses and relies upon the binding of a 
person or component and their key pair.  A Relying Party is responsible for validating the 
trust path from the user they are interacting with back to the RCA.  This involves 
checking the current CRLs for all certificates in the path of trust to ensure they are all 
current and have not been revoked.  (DoD Class 3 PKI CONOPS, 1999).  
c. Directory User 
A Directory User is someone who obtains information from a PKI 
directory about subscribers.  This information may include public key certificates, 
organizations, phone numbers, and e-mail addresses.  Most people who interact with a 
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PKI in any other role are often Directory Users as well.  (DoD PKI Class 3 CONOPS, 
1999) 
C. ADDITIONAL DOD PKI ROLES 
The user roles described in section B of this chapter are the most common roles 
that users of the DoD PKI will interface with directly.  Other roles are less likely to 
impact the day-to-day user unless there is a problem with the PKI.  These roles are 
described briefly in the following sections. 
1. Directory System Administrator 
The Directory System Administrator is responsible for maintaining the repository 
where users can obtain certificates and verify that they have not been revoked.  The 
Directory System Administrator is responsible for maintaining a high level of 
availability, performing adequate backups, and managing appropriate access controls to 
ensure the integrity of the directory itself.  (DoD PKI Class 3 CONOPS, 1999) 
2. Archive Administrator 
The Archive Administrator is responsible for the long-term storage of PKI 
materials.  This includes properly storing the material, providing the necessary protection, 
and performing updates and media conversions as necessary.  (DoD PKI Class 3 
CONOPS, 1999) 
3. Information Systems Security Officer 
The Information Systems Security Officer (ISSO) is responsible for overall 
component security.  There is one ISSO for the RCA workstation and each PKI server.  
The ISSO is responsible for making sure all policies and procedures are in place and 
followed, assigning privileges and access controls to CA accounts, reviewing the audit 
logs, and taking appropriate action in response to any suspicious activity or violation of 
procedures.  (DoD PKI Class 3 CONOPS, 1999) 
4. System Administrator 
The System Administrator is responsible for the operations and maintenance of a 
PKI component.  This includes configuration, installation, and recovery from failures.  
The System Administrator coordinates with the ISSO on all security issues and also 
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maintains backup files and off-site storage to ensure rebuild capability in case of a 
catastrophic failure.  (DoD PKI Class 3 CONOPS, 1999) 
The complexity of a PKI necessitates the various human roles and their related 
responsibilities.  The people in these roles must understand what their responsibilities are 
and have the knowledge required to fulfill them.  Chapter V will focus on the training 
requirements for the users of a PKI.  Specifically, it will describe the need for PKI 
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V. TRAINING FOR THE DOD PKI 
The implementation plans and the identification of user roles within the DoD PKI 
are key components of its overall success.  These define the framework within which 
operations will take place.  Another key aspect of any shift in policy or practice is the 
human factor.  The following quote from Austin reminds us that all components of a 
system must be taken into consideration.  “Most important is the fact that with IT 
security, just as with military security or castle fortification, security is only as good as its 
weakest components.” (Austin, 2001, p. 23-24)  This chapter addresses the need for 
training of all personnel who will be using the DoD PKI.  Without proper training, the 
integrity of the system as a whole will be in jeopardy. 
A.  THE TRAINING NEED 
The decision of the DoD to implement a PKI as a part of its Defense in Depth for 
information assurance was only the first step.  As the previous chapters have illustrated, a 
PKI is a complex environment that relies completely on the element of trust among all of 
its components.  Without this trust, a PKI will not provide the services and levels of 
assurance that it is designed for.  As with any environment or system that relies on the 
performance of all of its components, the system as a whole is only as strong, robust, or, 
in the case of PKI, as trustworthy as its weakest component.  The integrity of a PKI must 
be supported by appropriate policies, technologies, and user behaviors.  The policies and 
technologies are somewhat more static and controllable than the user behaviors. 
“Underlying a successful policy are resources to support enforcement, educate users, and 
modify the environment as external and internal conditions change.” (Austin, 2001, p. 26) 
As with the implementation of any new way of doing business, the resistance of people 
who must be involved in the DoD PKI will be the most difficult roadblock to overcome.  
The addition of the technological aspect to this change in business makes the task even 
more difficult.  In order to implement and maintain a PKI that performs its intended 
functions, the users must be properly trained and monitored to ensure the trustworthiness 
of the PKI is not broken by their actions or inactions. 
Training for the DoD PKI is not a small task. It is estimated that over three 
million certificates will be required for the DoD PKI implementation (Green, 2001).  
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Devising a method and delivering training to users of that many certificates is a complex 
effort.  In addition to the sheer numbers involved, the level of knowledge and 
understanding about PKI that is desired is not something the average person has.  
Training must conform to a certain greatest lower bound of existing knowledge so as to 
not leave out those with limited technology backgrounds.  The end users will not need the 
same level of knowledge as an LRA or RA, but they will still require a deep enough 
understanding of the PKI to recognize the impact that their individual actions will have 
on it. 
B. CURRENT TRAINING EFFORTS 
DoD personnel have a variety of PKI training materials available to them.  There 
are multiple websites from which materials may be downloaded, viewed online, or 
ordered.  The majority of these materials are text documents, slide presentations, 
interactive CD-ROMs, and video tapes.  Some training courses for RAs and LRAs are 
offered.  One of the largest Internet sources of PKI information is the Defense 
Information Systems Agency’s (DISA) Information Assurance Support Environment 
(IASE) website (http://iase.disa.mil).  This site provides links to general PKI information, 
training documents, and information on RA/LRA training courses offered by DISA.  The 
RA/LRA course is currently only offered in one location, and the dates are limited. The 
training documentation includes guides for the end user, LRA, and RA.   
Another source of PKI training is the Space and Naval Warfare Systems 
Command (SPAWAR).  SPAWAR has a website that deals with the Medium Grade 
Services which is a Defense Messaging System level of service that is provided by 
combining class three DoD PKI and e-mail clients.  This provides authentication and 
content integrity for the users of the messaging system.  Although this training focuses on 
these Medium Grade Services, it does provide a basic overview of public key 
cryptography. 
Part of the difficulty with DoD PKI training availability has arisen from the fact 
that the responsibility for this training is split.  As mentioned earlier, DISA does provide 
a limited amount of RA and LRA training, but the responsibility for end user training 
rests with the individual services.  Individual services do have some PKI training 
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available.  This discussion will focus on the efforts of the United States Navy and Marine 
Corps.  The Marine Corps utilizes the RA training provided by DISA and provides its 
own LRA training from their RA in Quantico, VA.  The RA is also the focal point for end 
user training. The newest training available for end users in the Marine Corps is a 
computer-based training (CBT) PKI Overview Course that will be provided via CD-
ROM. (Morris, 2001 (private communication))  
The Navy also utilizes the DISA RA/LRA training courses and materials, and has 
developed “PKI 101” training on the basic concepts of PKI.  According to Mr. Samir 
Othman, from the SPAWAR PKI Program Office, the Navy is taking an application-
based approach to PKI training.  Instead of developing and providing PKI training, they 
plan on adding PKI training to specific application training as the applications become 
PKI-enabled.  The Navy currently has no plans to provide any additional standard PKI 
training. (Othman, 2001) 
Although some DoD PKI training is available, there is not a single source that 
users can go to in order to obtain the training they require.  The current PKI training 
development efforts are segmented and vary among the DoD components.  This has led, 
and will continue to lead, to segmented, non-standardized training for users of the same 
PKI.  Personnel in the Marine Corps will receive different training from personnel in the 
Navy and the Army, yet they will all be expected to interact with each other and follow 
the same basic rules when using the DoD PKI.  Although some customization of training 
will be required based on the particular applications in use by a particular service or 
command, a more consistent, updated, centralized training effort would help ensure that 
all users of the DoD PKI are trained to a similar level and are able to understand and use 
the PKI effectively.  Without this common understanding of all users, the trustworthiness 
of the PKI will be at serious risk. 
C. A DOD PKI TRAINING FRAMEWORK 
1. The Argument for Web-based Training 
Before a discussion on the applicability of web-based training (WBT) to the 
problem of DoD PKI training can take place, a definition of web-based training must be 
provided. 
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WBT is instruction that is delivered via a Web browser (such as Microsoft 
Internet Explorer or Netscape Navigator) through the Internet or corporate 
intranet.  It offers online classes with facilities for interacting with a live 
instructor and other students or simply as independent study in which the 
student works on their own with, perhaps, contact through e-mail and real-
time ‘chat’ with the tutor and other students. (Steed, 1999, p. 28) 
In general, many benefits can be realized through the use of WBT.  Steed (1999) 
discusses these benefits from two perspectives: 1) that of the user or manager, and 2) that 
of the WBT provider.  From the user or manager perspective, WBT provides the 
following benefits: 
 
• Reduced training costs per person – costs to deliver training are approximately 
20-25% less than classroom delivery, and other indirect costs are saved as well 
(i.e. - travel, accommodations, etc.). 
• Consistency of presentation – the same exact training is available to everyone. 
• Up-to-date material – the most current training materials are available to all 
users. This is especially important for the Navy and PKI; the materials/technology 
change rapidly, and the students are numerous and geographically dispersed. 
• Faster completion of training – studies show a 30-70% time savings in WBT 
over classroom training because students have more control over the learning 
environment 
• Affordable technology – for the users, a connection to the Internet (or Intranet) 
and a computer with a web browser is all that is needed to access web-based 
training. The cost for these tools is small compared to the costs of travel and 
lodging for classroom training. Within the Navy, these tools already exist.   
• Course management control – the training can be centrally maintained or have 
multiple control sites depending on the specific needs of the system. This includes 
controlling who is accessing the training and monitoring student progress 
• Accessibility – web-based training can be accessible by anyone with a web 
browser and an Internet connection. This could include access from home as well 
as from the office or from anywhere in the world. 
 
According to Steed (1999), WBT provides the following benefits from a provider 
perspective: 
• Reduced training development costs – there are standard, platform independent 
tools available for web development. 
• Distribution ease – this is done instantly via a web server and/or database server.  
A single installation or update provides the entire user community with immediate 
access to the update. 
• Up-to-date content – as soon as the content is updated on the server, it is updated 
for all users. 
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Of course, there are some disadvantages to WBT as well. From a user, manager, 
or a provider perspective, Steed (1999) lists these disadvantages of WBT: 
• New software and procedures – although the use of web technology has grown, 
some organizations may be providing training to individuals who are not familiar 
with web browsers and are not comfortable with web technology. Additionally, a 
switch from traditional classroom training to web-based training will require 
changes in training procedures (i.e. – applying for training, getting approval for 
training, and scheduling training). For Navy personnel, these concerns are not too 
great as there are already many areas where computer-based and web-based 
training are being used. 
• Bandwidth limitations – variations in the speed of users’ Internet connections and 
the capability of their physical link to the Internet may require limitations on the 
materials provided by a web-based training system. The use of large-sized 
elements (i.e. – large graphics or multimedia files) would degrade the quality of a 
user’s experience unless they had a high-speed Internet connection. This issue 
must be taken into consideration when designing the system and creating the 
training elements. 
Some additional disadvantages of WBT also include: 
• No hands on aspect – lack of access to actual training systems (a PKI in this case) 
while completing training elements may be a disadvantage to some users. This 
problem exists in traditional classroom training as well, and it is only overcome 
by the use of a laboratory classroom environment. 
• No one-on-one with an instructor – some web-based training systems 
incorporate real-time chat sessions or allow for e-mail communications between a 
instructor and the students. Use of these tools is an attempt to simulate the face to 
face aspect of traditional classroom training. This is helpful, but the PKI Training 
Framework presented later in this chapter does not initially include either of these 
features. 
With so many benefits and few disadvantages, it may seem like WBT could be 
used for any type of training in any situation.  This is not the case.  Although the benefits 
are numerous, other factors must be considered before deciding to use WBT as a partial 
or complete solution to training requirements.  At least four issues must be examined: 
• Geographic location – “if your company is geographically dispersed, with many 
people to train, distributed learning is often a much more efficient approach to 
training.” (Steed, 1999, p. 222) 
• Size of audience – “…distributed learning will often be a more efficient method 
of reaching larger audiences, whereas instructor-led training may be more 
adequate for reaching smaller audiences.” (Steed, 1999, p. 222) 
• Dynamic information – “When training is of a dynamic nature, such as fast-
changing methods, procedures or products, it is important that learners are kept 
up-to-date with the latest changes. In these situations, it may be more efficient to 
deliver incremental training using distributed learning.” (Steed, 1999, P. 222) 
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• Timing of delivery – “When situations arise demanding rapid distribution of 
training, such as the release of new products, timing may be critical. In these 
situations, distributed learning is the most effective method.” (Steed, 1999, p. 
222) 
 
An examination of these issues can be done regarding DoD PKI training. The 
DoD in general and specifically the Navy is, without question, geographically dispersed, 
and a large number of personnel will require DoD PKI training.  These factors make 
distributed learning more efficient than instructor-led, classroom training.  The DoD PKI 
employs technologies that continue to change and evolve.  This results in a need for more 
timely distribution of new technological products and procedures.  In this situation, 
distributed learning has the edge over classroom-based courses in the ability to delivery 
the most current information to students on a near real-time basis.   
One may conclude that PKI training in the DoD is a prime candidate for a web-
based delivery system.  The current methods of providing PKI training to DoD users have 
many disadvantages that can be overcome by utilizing existing technology within the 
DoD.  A user accessing training from his or her office overcomes the high cost of 
attending training courses.  The existing access to the Internet as well as command and 
service intranets means that no additional investment in technological capability would 
have to be made in order to access online training resources.  A more consolidated 
training resource would take the burden off of the users and save them the time and effort 
it takes to locate training from multiple sources.  A centrally managed training source 
would also allow the most recent information to be available in the time it takes to update 
a database or a web page.  The content of PKI training is amenable to the web as it is 
already delivered electronically in many cases.  A web-based training framework for PKI 
would provide a more organized, more flexible method of obtaining the specific training 
required or desired by all DoD PKI users.   
2. A PKI Training Framework 
Based on the previous discussion, a web-based framework for DoD PKI training 
would improve the current state of this training effort.  The remainder of this chapter will 
focus on the characteristics of such a framework.  The detailed design information 
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presented in the following sections will be implemented into an actual training 
framework prototype. 
As an overview, the proposed web-based PKI training framework has the 
following basic attributes: 
• It would be centrally maintained.  This attribute is critical for maintaining 
the most current, up-to-date training information available. Central 
management and maintenance is a key requirement.  A logical candidate 
for this responsibility is the Root Certificate Authority or another 
designated office responsible for the overall training effort. If a single 
controlling entity is not an option, each component could manage their 
own training and maintain a central server containing the training 
framework and their own component-specific training.  Due to the overlap 
of PKI training requirements between DoD components, a working group 
or task force made up of representatives from each component could be 
created to ensure information sharing and reduce duplication of effort. The 
maintenance issue is discussed further in section D.5 of this chapter. 
•  It would be accessible via a web browser through an Internet connection.  
The interface will be designed to function properly using the current 
versions of both Microsoft Internet Explorer and Netscape Navigator.  
Netscape Navigator is the browser required for downloading keys and 
certificates within the DoD PKI, and Internet Explorer is the standard web 
browser for the Navy. 
• It would allow users to access training modules based on their role within 
the PKI (CA, RA, LRA, End User, etc.). 
• It would allow users to access task-specific training to be used as a 
refresher or a type of help file. 
These general attributes are applicable across the board for all users.  There may, 
however, be circumstances in which each service, or individual commands may require 
additional flexibility in the way the training is presented.  Although this potential need for 
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customization is recognized, the goal of this thesis is to design and develop the core 
framework only.  As with any software system, upgrades and improvements are expected 
throughout its life cycle. 
Another requirement for flexibility involves training for PKI-enabled 
applications.  Different components and commands may employ numerous PKI-enabled 
applications.  The users of the PKI training framework will need to be able to select from 
a variety of application-specific training modules.  For example, numerous e-mail 
programs are in use within the DoD today.  Training for all e-mail programs in use 
should be available within the training framework, and the user should be able to select 
the specific program for which he or she requires training.  Eventually, the framework 
could be designed to allow individual components or commands to set up a specific 
profile that includes only command-specific PKI-enabled applications.  This would filter 
the training available to users from a particular component or command. Either way, the 
user should have one address for the consolidated training that can then link them to 
service level pages with service-specific training, if this is a requirement. A drawback of 
service-level training pages is the maintenance and update of these pages. Another 
disadvantage is the potential for lack of consistency.  
For the initial design, the goal of the training framework will be to accommodate 
all of the potential software options and facilitate the availability of training for each 
option.  The user would be able to select from all of the available options.  
D. PROTOTYPE DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT 
The DOD PKI training framework prototype involves two main components: a 
database and a web-based interface.  The database will store information, and the web-
based interface will display the information from the database as requested by the user.  
Although the specific details will be outlined in the following sections, there are some 
basic characteristics of a good web-based training program.  Driscoll (1998) states that a 
well-designed web-based training program is interactive, has an easy-to-use interface, 
contains structured lessons, uses multimedia effectively, and pays close attention to both 
technical and educational details.  A well-designed WBT also allows the user to have 
adequate control and freedom of movement within the site.  The design of the DOD PKI 
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training framework will focus on the achievement of these goals with ease of use as a 
priority. 
1. Goals and Required Functionality 
The goal of the DoD PKI training framework is to provide a single method for 
delivering the most current PKI training to all DoD PKI users or potential users via a web 
browser and an Internet connection.  The framework will serve all DoD personnel 
involved with the DoD PKI in any of the previously defined user roles.  Because this 
group of people is large and diverse, the interface to the framework must be 
straightforward and easy to use with a minimum of basic computer skills.  These basic 
computer skills include connecting to the Internet and using a web browser.   
The framework will provide the following functions: 
• The capability to search for training based on a particular user role (the 
prototype will only include the Registration Authority, the Local 
Registration Authority, and the User) 
• The capability to search for training on a particular task or topic  
• The capability to assess a user’s knowledge of a particular training 
element (this aspect is a requirement, but will not be fully implemented in 
the prototype) 
• The capability to track a user’s completion of training elements (this will 
be linked to the assessment element) 
The tracking capability is essential for management of users at the command 
level.  Command or component policies will determine the specific training requirements 
for people serving in the various roles within the DoD PKI.  For example, before being 
issued a key pair, an end user would be required to complete basic overview training and 
end user training. Requirements would also apply for RAs, LRAs, and all other user roles 
defined within the DoD PKI.  Because the RAs and LRAs are responsible for issuing key 
pairs, they will need to have access to the training logs of their users. 
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2. Task List Development 
A list of PKI tasks is required to provide the functionality listed above.  For this 
prototype, a list of PKI tasks was developed using the existing training documentation as 
a guide.  The specific documents used were the DISA trainee guides for RAs, LRAs, and 
Users, and the Marine Corps trainee guides for LRAs and Users (DISA, 2000) (United 
States Marine Corps, 2000).  The task lists developed from these guides are contained in 
Tables 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3. 
User Tasks
Obtain an identity certificate
Obtain an e-mail certificate
Find another user's certificate
Add a Netscape Communicator profile
Verify and copy certificates in the Netscape Personal Security Manager
Back up keys and certificates to a floppy disk
Delete a certificate from Netscape Personal Security Manager
Delete key3.db files in your profile directory
Import a certificate from a floppy disk
Download certificates
Determine which e-mail certificates you have
Send signed and encrypted e-mail
Receive signed and encrypted e-mail
Configure e-mail client




Add a Netscape Communicator profile
Install smartcard reader
Install smartcard software
Check the smartcard reader and token
Inititialize the smartcard
Change smartcard password
Change the token label
Request an LRA certificate
Import a certificate
Download, install, and configure the LRA workstation application
Move LRA encryption keys and certificate to the smartcard
Create a new user data file
Submit a user data file
Archive the user date file
Open and edit user data file
Re-enter users from the archive file
Import user data files
Print the user acknowledgement form
Send the RA the floppy containing the user data file
Attach a user data file to an encrypted e-mail message
Change the LRA settings
Access the LRA administration menu
Upload a user data file
Unlock a user account
Download the LRA application
Download the LRA release notes
Revoke certificate
Obtain server certificates
Find your LRA certificate
Search the CA servers
Table 5.2 LRA Task List 
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RA Tasks
Add a Netscape Communicator profile
Install the smartcard reader
Install the smartcard software
Check the smartcard reader and token
Initialize the smartcard
Change the smartcard password
Change the token label
Obtain the RA certificate
Move the RA encryption keys and certificate to the smartcard
Create LRAs
Revoke certificates
Update/Delete an entry on the directory server
Prepare e-mail certificates
Approve server certificates
Upload user data files from floppy disk 
Search the CA servers
Find your RA certificate
Table 5.3 RA Task List 
 
3. Database Design 
The underlying database for the training framework is a key component of its 
overall design and functionality.  The database will contain tables of information and 
documents that will be accessed by the users via a web-based interface.  The database 
design must provide the capability to fulfill the functional requirements stated previously.  
This section will present the design details of the PKI training database.  Those readers 
not familiar with the various models and tables presented may refer to Appendix A for 
additional information. 
a. General Description 
The PKI training database will store all of the information required for the 
training framework.  This includes information on PKI user roles, PKI tasks, PKI training 
framework users, PKI training elements, PKI training evaluation elements, and individual 
user PKI training records.  Additionally, information on each DoD component will be 
included.  This information will allow for future modifications regarding component-
level customization of the training framework.  The PKI user roles will be used to 
customize training based on a particular user role.  The PKI tasks list will allow users to 
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obtain training for a specific task only.  Information about each user will provide the 
capability to track his or her training and evaluation progress.  The PKI training elements 
are the actual training files.  The PKI evaluation elements provide an evaluation of a 
user’s grasp of a particular PKI training element.  PKI training records contain the 
evaluation results for each user.   
The training record for each user will track only the evaluation elements 
that have been completed by the user.  This will provide confirmation of completion of 
any required training prior to the issuance of a PKI certificate, or the assumption of other 
roles within the PKI.  Users will be able to access all available training at anytime for the 
purposes of refreshing their knowledge or obtaining new information that has become 
available.  Any requirements and time intervals for this kind of refresher training should 
be determined at the component or command level and should be based on PKI roles.  
The framework would allow for tracking this refresher training only if the user completed 
the evaluation element(s) corresponding to the refresher training element(s).  As refresher 
training requirements are established, the framework could be modified as necessary to 
accommodate additional tracking mechanisms. 
The following sections detail the specific design of the tables and fields 
within the PKI training database.  These models will be used as the basis for the 
prototype PKI training database.   
b. Database Schema 
The following is a schema of the PKI training database.  A database 
schema defines a database’s structure, tables, and relationships.  It lists each table (in all 
capital letters) followed by a list of the fields contained within that table.  A field 
underlined and listed in bold font is the primary key for that table.  If multiple fields are 
underlined and listed in bold, they comprise a composite primary key for the table.  A 
field name followed by “_FK” indicates a field that is a foreign key or the primary key 
from another table.  The presence of this key indicates a relationship between the tables. 
49 
 USER ROLE (UserRoleID, UserRoleName) 
 
USER ROLE TRAINING ELEMENT JOIN  (UserRoleID_FK, 
TrainingElementID_FK) 
 
USER (SSN, LastName, FirstName, MiddleInitial, Password, ComponentCode_FK) 
 
TRAINING RECORD (DateCompleted, Result, SSN_FK, EvaluationElementID_FK) 
 
TRAINING ELEMENT (TrainingElementID, TrainingElementDescription, 
TrainingElementFileName) 
 
TASK (TaskID, TaskDescription) 
 
TASK TRAINING ELEMENT JOIN  (TaskID_FK, TrainingElementID_FK) 
 
TASK USER ROLE JOIN  (TaskID_FK, UserRoleID_FK) 
 
EVALUATION ELEMENT (EvaluationElementID, EvaluationElementFileName, 
TrainingElementID_FK) 
 
COMPONENT  (ComponentCode, ComponentName) 
 
COMPONENT TRAINING ELEMENT JOIN (ComponentCode_FK, Training 
ElementID_FK) 
 
c. Semantic Object Model 
Figure 5.1 is a semantic object model for the PKI training database.  This 
model depicts each table as an object.  Within the object box for each table are all the 
fields contained within the table.  Where relationships exist between tables, each one is 
included with the fields of the other.  Fields preceded by two asterisks and listed in bold 
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font are the primary keys for their respective tables.  The numbers after each field 
indicate minimum and maximum cardinality. 




The following tables provide the metadata for the PKI training database.  
Table 5.4 is the metadata for the tables, and Table 5.5 is the metadata for the fields.   
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Table Name Number of Fields Primary Key
Component 2 ComponentCode
Component Training Element Join 2 ComponentCode_FK, TrainingElementID_FK
Evaluation Element 3 EvaluationElementID
Task 2 TaskID
Task Training Element Join 2 TaskID_FK, TrainingElementID_FK
Task User Role Join 2 TaskID_FK, UserRoleID_FK
Training Element 4 TrainingElementID
Training Record 4 DateCompleted, Result, SSN_FK, EvaluationElementID_FK
User 6 SSN
User Role 2 UserRoleID
User Role Training Element Join 2 UserRoleID_FK, TrainingElementID_FK
Table 5.4 Table Metadata for the PKI Training Database
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Field  N am e Table N am e
**ComponentCode Component
Co mponentN ame Component
**ComponentCode_FK Component T raining E le
**T rainingE lementID _FK Component T raining E le
**E valuatio nE lementID E valuatio n E lement
E valuatio nE lementFileN ame E valuatio n E lement
T rainingE lementID _FK E valuatio n E lement
**T askID T ask
T askD escription T ask
**T askID _FK T ask T raining E lement J
**T rainingE lementID _FK T ask T raining E lement J
**T askID _FK T ask U ser R o le Jo in
**U serRo leID _FK T ask U ser R o le Jo in
**T rainingE lementID T raining E lement
T rainingE lementD escription T raining E lement
T rainingE lementFileN ame T raining E lement
**D ateC ompleted T raining Record
**Result T raining Record
**SSN _FK T raining Record
**E valuatio nE lementID _FK T raining Record
**SSN U ser
LastN ame U ser
FirstN ame U ser
M iddleInitial U ser
Passw ord U ser
Co mponentCode_FK U ser
**U serRo leID U ser Ro le
U serRo leN ame U ser Ro le
**U serRo leID _FK U ser Ro le T raining E lem
**T rainingE lementID _FK U ser Ro le T raining E lem
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Table 5.5 Field D ata Type Length D escription
Text 5 A unique ID  fo r a component
Text 50 T he name o f the compo nent
ment Jo in Text 5 A unique ID  fo r a component
ment Jo in Long Integer A unique ID  fo r a training element
Long Integer A unique ID  fo r an evaluation element
Text 50 T he file name fo r the evaluation element
Long Integer A unique ID  fo r a training element
Long Integer A unique ID  fo r a task
Text 100 A sho rt descriptio n o f a task
o in Long Integer A unique ID  fo r a task
o in Long Integer A unique ID  fo r a training element
Long Integer A unique ID  fo r a task
Text 5 A unique ID  fo r a user ro le
Long Integer A unique ID  fo r a training element
Text 50 A sho rt descriptio n o f a training element
Text 50 T he file name fo r the training element
Sho rt D ate T he date an evaluation element w as completed
Text 4 T he result o f an evaluation element, "Pass" o r "Fail"
Text 11 Social Security N umber o f the user
Long Integer A unique ID  fo r an evaluation element
Text 11 Social Security N umber o f the user
Text 50 U ser's last name
Text 50 U ser's first name
Text 1 U ser's middle initial
Text 20 U ser's passw ord to  login
Text 5 A unique ID  fo r a component
Text 5 A unique ID  fo r a user ro le
Text 50 T he user ro le title o r name
ent Jo in Text 5 A unique ID  fo r a user ro le
ent Jo in Long Integer A unique ID  fo r a training element
Metadata for the PKI Training Database
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e. Relationship Diagram 
Figure 5.2 is a relationship diagram for the PKI training database.  This 
figure shows the links between the tables of the PKI training database and how they 
relate to each other. 
 
 
Figure 5.2 PKI Training Database – Relationship Diagram 
 
4. Interface Design 
a. Design Process 
Designing an effective web interface involves several steps.  Lynch and 
Horton (1999) identify six major stages of web site development: 1) site definition and 
planning, 2) information architecture, 3) site design, 4) site construction, 5) site 
marketing, and 6) tracking, evaluation, and maintenance.  The development of the DoD 
PKI training framework in this thesis will proceed through stage two and move into stage 
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three with the development of a prototype system.  The remaining stages will not be 
addressed, but they are potential areas for follow-on work.   
Site definition and planning involves defining the goals, objectives, scope, 
and functionality of the site (Lynch and Horton, 1999).  These elements have been 
defined earlier in this chapter.  In summary, the DoD PKI training framework must 
provide the most current PKI training to all potential DoD users via a web browser and an 
Internet connection.  The framework will allow users to search for training based on a 
specific role or a specific task.  Users will be evaluated upon their completion of training 
elements, and a training record will be maintained for each of them. 
Information architecture involves determining the details and the 
organization of the content of the site (Lynch and Horton, 1999).  The bulk of the content 
of the DoD PKI training framework will be training elements and their corresponding 
evaluation elements.  This information may be presented in a variety of formats, and the 
goal of the framework is to accommodate as many formats as possible.  The most 
important aspect in this stage is the organization of the site.  The way a user is allowed to 
navigate through the site should be flexible enough to allow him or her to obtain the 
desired information efficiently and directly.  The user should be able to find the desired 
information with the fewest mouse clicks possible.  The appropriate search tools must be 
available, and the user must never feel lost within the site.  The specific flow and design 
of the DoD PKI training framework is provided in the following sections.  The 
information architecture stage is also the time during which prototypes should be built.  
This will allow for the testing of navigation through the site as well as obtaining feedback 
on the overall design of the interface (Lynch and Horton, 1999). 
The site design stage involves detailing the overall design of the pages, 
generating the content and the code, and completing all the components so they are ready 
for the construction stage (Lynch and Horton, 1999).  Although this thesis will include 
the development of a prototype (information architecture stage), it will also include the 
design of the high level pages of the site.  This will provide a starting point for actual user 
testing and modification of the existing interface.  The framework will only be populated 
with a sampling of data to show functionality and allow for user feedback on the 
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navigational and design features of the site.  Essentially, the prototype framework will be 
an initial, small-scale implementation to show the desired functionality and allow for 
testing and future revisions.   
b. Web site hierarchy 
The DoD PKI training framework web interface will begin with a “Login” 
page.  This is where existing users can login, and new users can register with the system.  
Having users authenticate with a password at the beginning of the session will 
accomplish two main goals.  The first is to verify the user’s identity for the purposes of 
allowing him or her to access training records or complete evaluation elements.  The 
second is to prevent non-registered users from accessing the training data and potentially 
slowing down access for those who are registered users. 
After entering valid credentials, the user will be taken to the main 
navigation page of the site from here on out called the “Home” page.  This page will 
contain the main navigational elements of the site.  Users will be able to access 
“Training” (via various search methods), complete “Evaluations”, view their “Training 
Record”, or “Logoff” the system.  Additional options will include a frequently asked 
questions or “FAQ” page, a “Feedback” page, a “Help” page, and a “Contact Us” page.  
All of these links will be contained in a contents frame of the “Home” page.  These links 
will be available from any page within the site except those pages that are displayed in a 
new window.  Pages designed to be displayed in a new window include the display of 
training elements and completion evaluations selected by the user.  When a user selects 
the “Logoff” option, he or she will be given the option of logging off or returning to the 
“Home” page.  These will be the only two options from the “Logoff” page.  A general 
flow diagram of the web interface pages is included as Figure 5.3. 
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Figure 5.3 DOD PKI Training Framework - Interface Flow Diagram 
 
Regarding the training and evaluation elements, links to these items will 
be presented to users within the main organization of the page.  If they want to view or 
download items, new windows will be displayed.  This will allow the users to keep their 
place within the primary framework and come back, from the new window, at any time 
during their view or download session. 
c. Page layout and design 
To fulfill the goal of allowing the users to access the information they 
desire with the fewest number of mouse clicks, a frames-based design will be used.  
Specifically, the interface will consist of three frames: a header frame, a contents frame, 
and a main frame.  The layout of these frames is presented in Figure 5.4 below. 
58 
Figure 5.4 DOD PKI Training Framework – Frame Layout 
 
The header frame will contain the title of the site, and the name of the user 
who is currently logged in.  The contents frame will contain the navigational links for the 
site.  These links are Home, Training, Evaluations, Training Records, FAQ, Help, 
Feedback, Contact Us, and Logoff.  The main frame will contain the content selected by 
the user.  Initially, the main frame will contain a welcome page that briefly describes the 
site and lists the overall point of contact for the site.  
The majority of the content selected by users will be displayed in the main 
frame, and the header and contents frames will be static.  The exception to this will be 
when the user selects a link to a specific training or evaluation element.  These items will 
be displayed in a new browser window.  The existing framework window will remain 
open to allow users to return to the framework at any time.  Additionally, when a user 
selects the “Logoff” option, the logoff page will appear in the full window, and the 
header and contents frames will no longer be displayed.   
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The site will contain numerous HTML (hypertext mark-up language) and 
ASP (active server pages) pages.  The html pages will present basic text information and 
navigational links.  The active server pages will provide the link to the DoD PKI Training 
database.  These pages will provide result sets from queries entered by users.  The 
distinction between these pages will be essentially seamless to users, and their ease of use 
will be maximized.  Table 5.6 below contains a listing of all of the pages that will 
comprise the site and their file names. 
Page Description File Name
Login page index.htm
Registration page registration.asp
Registration Confirmation page register_confirm.htm
Login processing page login.asp
Login Error page login_error.htm
Footer Information page footer_include.htm
Home page (frameset page) home.htm
Contents page (lefthand frame contents) contents.htm
Welcome page (initial main frame contents) welcome.htm
Header page (header frame contents) header.htm
Training Element home page training.htm
Training Element Search by User Role page train_user_role.asp
Training Element Search by Task page train_task.asp
Task Search by User Role page tasks_user_role.asp
Evaluation Element home page evaluation.asp
Training Records home page training_record.asp





Logoff processing page logoff.asp
Table 5.6 DOD PKI Training Framework – Interface Files 
In addition to the layout, the site will utilize a standard font and color 
scheme to ensure consistency throughout all of its pages.  The exception to this will be 
the training and evaluation elements.  Since one of the goals of the site is to 
accommodate multiple types of training elements, it is assumed that the elements will be 
designed and presented in various formats with various design techniques.  The 
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standardization of the training and evaluation elements is beyond the scope of this thesis 
and is a good topic for further research and development.  The potential for variation in 
the training and evaluation elements is more support for having them displayed in new 
windows separate from the training framework itself.  
Graphic elements and special text features that greatly increase the size of 
the interface files will be avoided.  The framework can perform the required functions 
with a minimal use of these items.  The training elements may contain larger files or 
special presentations (such as audio or video files), but these larger items can be 
downloaded and studied offline.  The only danger with this practice is that the 
information may be updated and the user may be holding on to an old file.  Requiring that 
all elements within the site, including all training elements, have an accurate date stamp 
to inform the user of the last time the item was updated will ease this potential problem.  
A simple comparison of the dates will let the user know if he or she is holding the most 
current version of an element. 
Some specific details regarding the prototype design are provided in 
screen shots contained in Appendix B of this thesis.  As previously stated, this prototype 
is intended to serve as a starting point for user testing, further requirements definition, 
and improvements in design and functionality.  Scalability is also an issue that must be 
accounted for when a system like this is to be deployed DoD-wide.   
5. Maintenance and Control 
In order to ensure that the most up-to-date training is available and that all users 
have access to the same training, the content of the PKI training framework must be 
centrally controlled and maintained.  Because the training for the DoD PKI has been 
pushed down to the component level, there is currently no central point of contact or 
central office of responsibility for training at the DoD level.  In order for the web-based 
PKI training framework to be effective, it must be controlled at this level, or delegated as 
a whole to a specific component or program office.  Several options exist within the 
current DoD PKI organizational structure. 
The first option is that the DoD PKI Program Office take control of the training 
task.  They are the central point of contact for current DoD PKI issues.  Since all 
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implementation and policy guidance flows down through this office, they would be a 
logical choice to control the training that is being developed and maintain the training 
available to users via the PKI training framework.   
Another option is to select a DoD PKI Certificate Authority to take over the 
training task.  This is not an ideal situation as the CA is already tasked with all of the CA 
responsibilities, and they may not have the required expertise to guide the development 
and maintain the content of the training framework. 
A third option is to delegate the PKI training for all of DoD to one component.  
The Navy, Marine Corps, Army, or Air Force could be tasked with the development and 
maintenance of all DoD PKI training including the maintenance of the training 
framework.  A problem with this option is that each component may have different 
applications in use and different PKI implementations.  If one component was in charge 
of the PKI training task, they could not perform this duty in a vacuum.  Coordination 
between PKI representatives from each DoD component would be required on a regular 
basis to ensure that the interests and training needs of each were being addressed.  With 
one component ultimately in charge, friction may develop between them and the other 
components involved.   
Because of the scale and importance of the DoD PKI training effort, it is highly 
recommended that it be handled at the DoD level.  All components and commands 
involved with the DoD PKI would be involved in the development of specific training 
elements, but the overall control and maintenance of the training system would be done at 
a higher level.  This would ensure that all components’ needs are being met, and that all 
DoD PKI users have access to the most current training information and materials 
available. 
Several obstacles to implementing this high level of control exist in the current 
environment.  The two most important issues are 1) the focus of the PKI PMO on higher 
level policy and implementation issues and their organizational distance from the 
intended recipients of the training, and 2) the existing efforts that have been made by 
individual components regarding PKI training.  The Navy and the Marine Corps have 
some existing training procedures in place, and, replacing these with a centrally managed 
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training framework developed with little or no involvement by the services could have a 
detrimental affect on morale and decrease the commitment to the training and PKI in 
general.  A potential solution is the implementation of the proposed training framework at 
the component level while ensuring coordination and communication between all 
components involved.  The framework could be provided as a tool and a delivery method 
for the existing training within each component.  This would allow for the distributed 
approach to some of the more basic level PKI training while leaving more advanced 
training, such as RA and LRA training, to the traditional classroom setting.  Components 
would have a significant amount of control over their piece of the framework, but they 
would be able to access contents provided by other components as well.  This idea 
conflicts with the requirement for a centrally managed and maintained framework, but is 
a more workable, realistic option that will begin to push the training effort in the right 
direction. 
E. TRACKING THE TRAINING 
Once a viable DoD PKI training system is implemented, tracking individual 
training will become an important task.  The best way to handle this tracking is to build 
the functionality into the training system itself.  The PKI training framework prototype is 
designed with this in mind.  The PKI training database contains a table called 
‘TRAINING RECORD’ which will contain information about users and the training 
elements they have completed.  The link between the user and the completed training 
elements will be made through evaluation elements.  These will be evaluation or 
assessment tools that will be developed for each of the training elements or groups of 
training elements.  After completing a training element or set of training elements, a user 
would proceed to the corresponding evaluation element.  The developer of the training 
and evaluation elements would determine the criteria for passing the element.  The user 
would complete the evaluation element and the result would be stored in the ‘TRAINING 
RECORD’ table as an instance of a training record for that user, for the specific training 
element.   
In addition to this automated tracking, components or commands will need to 
institute policies and procedures that will ensure that users do not use PKI-enabled 
applications for which they have not been trained.  This may be best accomplished by 
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providing the necessary impact with the basic training that is required prior to receiving a 
PKI certificate.  Users at all levels must have a clear understanding of the impact their 
actions may have upon the PKI as a whole. This understanding is best reinforced through 
the attitudes and actions of other PKI users and especially those in positions of greater 
responsibility (i.e. – RAs and LRAs). 
Because these training records will contain personal information about individual 
users and their performance on the evaluation elements, the access to these records must 
be protected.  The users themselves will be required to select a password to access the 
training system as a whole.  This password will allow users to view their own personal 
training records.  Additionally, there may be a need for LRAs or RAs to have access to 
the training records of the End Users they register with the DoD PKI.  This would allow 
the LRA or RA to verify that End Users who apply for a certificate have completed any 
required training.  These requirements should be developed at the DoD level to ensure 
that the appropriate levels of training are being completed by End Users throughout the 
DoD.  Individual components should be allowed to modify the DoD PKI training 
requirements only to make them more strict or require training over and above that 
required by the DoD.  The verification that any required training was completed should 
then be a standard step in the DoD PKI registration process. 
As new PKI-enabled applications are brought online, existing users should be 
notified and instructed to complete the required training for the applications prior to using 
them.  It is not desirable or feasible to revoke and reissue certificates to users each time a 
new PKI-enabled application is installed.  Once again, the importance of proper 
behaviors and adherence to procedures regarding the PKI must be emphasized in the 
initial basic PKI training and reinforced through command climate and leadership of 
other PKI users. 
The implementation of any new technology requires some degree of training for 
the users.  With the DoD PKI, the requirement for training of its users is extremely great.  
The nature of the DoD PKI is such that it relies heavily on the trust within the system.  
The fastest way to destroy that trust is to unleash untrained, ignorant users on it.  Because 
this training is vital to the successful use of the DoD PKI, the author believes that a 
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segmented, distributed approach is not ideal. The author does however; recognize the 
potential difficulties of implementing the proposed framework at the DoD level.  The 
potential implementation of this training framework at the component level with overall 
coordination and communication between components would be a more realistic step 
toward improving the existing training efforts.  Potential users of the DoD PKI need a 
consistent, up-to-date, user-friendly method of obtaining the appropriate training for their 
potential role within the DoD PKI.  Web-based training has been shown to be an 
efficient, effective method of delivery in similar circumstances.  The prototype PKI 
training framework will provide the basic structure within which DoD PKI training can 






































The concept of a public key infrastructure in itself is not an easy one to master.  
Adding the existing complexities of the DoD (i.e. – numerous components, large 
numbers of organizations, cultural diversity, wide range of existing technology) makes 
the implementation of a PKI an even more daunting task.  Given the need for the added 
security that a PKI can provide, implementation of the DoD PKI is still a task that must 
be faced.  This thesis has presented a basic overview of the PKI technology and has 
highlighted the need for all users within a PKI to be trained appropriately.  The PKI 
training framework was developed as a tool to assist in fulfilling this massive training 
requirement within the DoD.  The framework and prototype developed by the author is 
however, only the beginning.  The following paragraphs outline potential follow-on work 
related to this thesis and additional related areas for future research. 
A. THE DOD PKI TRAINING FRAMEWORK 
This thesis provided an initial prototype of the proposed DoD PKI training 
framework.  This is only the beginning of what will need to be accomplished in order to 
make this framework a reality within DoD.  The work presented in this thesis should be 
continued with testing of the prototype to 1) identify additional requirements, 2) define 
areas where it is lacking in required functionality, and, perhaps most important, 3) ensure 
its usability.  While the interface is being tested and improved, there must also be an 
effort to develop the training and evaluation elements that the framework will contain.  
This effort will most likely involve people and organizations throughout the DoD.  The 
framework itself will only be as useful as the content it contains.  A mechanism to 
identify, develop, and review the needed training and evaluation elements must be 
implemented.   
The control of the training framework and its content is also a key issue that will 
require further investigation.  The control and management options presented in this 
thesis are just that, options.  Additional organizational research within the DoD is needed 
to determine the most effective level of control and management for a system like the 
DoD PKI Training framework.  The advantages and disadvantages of each possible 
scenario should be analyzed with regard to the overall goal of the framework and the PKI 
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training effort as a whole – providing the right training to the right people at the right 
time to minimize the risks of violating the trust required within the DoD PKI.   
Other issues specific to the proposed framework include expanding the tracking 
portion of the system to better accommodate the tracking of refresher training.  This will 
be an important requirement as the DoD PKI grows and matures.  More certificates will 
be issued, and more PKI-enabled applications will be installed causing the need for new 
and refresher training to be ongoing.   
Finally, based on the level of implementation and the level of control of the 
training framework, it will need to be developed as a more robust system.  The prototype 
was developed as a proof of concept and a demonstration of the planned interface.  The 
underlying database will need to be built using enterprise-level software and maintained 
on hardware capable of handling the amount of use that is expected.  As with any system, 
appropriate plans for mirroring, backups, and security will need to be developed and 
implemented.  As was stated previously, the development of the initial prototype was 
simply a first step. 
B. ADDITIONAL AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
In addition to the follow-on work involving the training framework, there are 
related issues that, with further research, could prove beneficial to the DoD PKI.  Some 
of these areas are listed below. 
• The identification of required training elements for each role within the 
DoD PKI.  This would set the minimum standard for an individual to meet 
prior to assuming any role within the DoD PKI. 
• The identification of refresher training requirements.  This would include 
the timing and content requirements of refresher training.   
• The development of procedures to ensure proper training for new PKI-
enabled applications is completed prior to the use of these applications.  
The overall PKI must have checks and balances that will provide for an 
adequate level of assurance that users will not perform functions using 
PKI-enabled applications for which they have not been trained. 
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• The development of some type of ‘emergency procedures’ for DoD PKI 
users.  These would provide assistance to users who discover a potential or 
an actual breach in the trust of the DoD PKI either through user actions or 
system errors or failures.  For example, these procedures would  provide 
specific instructions to a user who discovers that his or her PKI certificate-
containing token has been lost.   
These additional aspects of training for the DoD PKI are necessary to provide as 
close to a complete training solution as possible.  While there may always be a need for 
face to face, classroom training, it is this author’s opinion that the timely, distributed 
nature of a web-based training framework can fulfill a large portion of the training need 
in the case of the DoD PKI.  As with the PKI itself, this training tool must also be 
implemented properly in order to achieve its desired goals.  By leveraging existing 
technology, and forming a more coordinated effort, the DoD can enhance the success of 
its PKI by providing more up-to-date and timely training to its current and potential users 
around the world.  As the DoD becomes more and more “joint”, the concept of a more 
centralized effort may become more of a reality.  Until then, any step closer to that reality 
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APPENDIX A.  DATABASE DESIGN AND MODELING 
This appendix presents a brief introduction to database design and modeling.  It 
includes database basics and a description of some database models – specifically those 
used in designing the PKI training database.  This information was adapted from 
Kroenke, 2000. 
1. DATABASE BASICS 
A database can be described as a “…self-describing collection of integrated 
records” (Kroekne, 2000, p. 569).  Databases are typically made up of tables or relations, 
fields or columns, and records or rows.  A relation is a two-dimensional table that is 
comprised of fields and records.  The columns of the table comprise the fields, and the 
rows of the table comprise the records.  Each record in a table must be unique.  To 
facilitate this, each table contains a field that is designated as a primary key for the table.  
A primary key must be a unique value that is never repeated within the table.  The 
primary key is typically some kind of identification number or serial number.  If the data 
being stored does not have a clearly identifiable, unique value associated with it, an 
additional field can be added to provide this unique key (i.e. – an auto-numbering field 
that assigns a unique number to each record as it is added to the table). 
Tables typically contain related information.  For example, a table named 
‘Student Info’ may contain a student’s name, identification number, address, phone 
number, and grade level.  Another table named ‘Course Schedule’ may contain the names 
of courses, the time each course is offered, and how many students are enrolled in each 
course.  If desired, a link between these tables could be created to facilitate the creation of 
a course schedule for each student.  
When designing a database, the requirements must be clearly understood.  These 
requirements most often involve the presentation of certain information in a particular 
manner.  In order to effectively design a database to meet the requirements, an accurate 
database model must be developed.  This database model provides the link between the 
requirements and the actual building of the database.  A database model identifies what 
must be stored, the structure of the storage, and the relationships among the stored data.  
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Numerous modeling techniques exist.  The following sections will describe the database 
schema, the semantic object model, and database metadata. 
2. DATABASE SCHEMA 
A database schema defines the database and provides the design by which the 
database is built (Kroenke, 2000).  A schema includes table names, primary keys, and 
field names.  The schema is organized by table, with the fields of the table following.  
Consider the following example: 
TABLE NAME (PrimaryKeyField, Field2, Field3, Field4_FK) 
The primary key field is underlined and in bold font.  In some cases, multiple fields may 
be used together to form the primary key.  In that situation, all fields comprising the key 
would be underlined and in bold font.  The last field listed in the example ends in ‘FK’.  
This indicates that this field is a foreign key in the table.  A foreign key is a field “…that 
is a key of one or more relations (tables) other than the one in which it appears” 
(Kroenke, 2000, p. 573).  Foreign keys are placed in tables to enable relationships 
between them.   
 A complete schema for a database will identify the tables, fields, and the basic 
relationships that exist between the tables.  This is a good start, but a Semantic Object 
Model provides even more information. 
3. SEMANTIC OBJECT MODEL 
A Semantic Object Model (SOM) is one method of creating a database model 
based on what is to be stored, the characteristics of these things, and the relationships 
between them.  In a SOM, the items to be stored or represented are called semantic 
objects.  A more formal definition of a semantic object is a “…named collection of 
attributes that sufficiently describes a distinct identity” (Kroenke, 2000, p. 74).  Semantic 
objects are grouped into classes and named to correspond with what they represent.  
Using the PKI training database as an example, one class or group of objects is called 
‘USER ROLES’.  The attributes or fields contained within this class describe each 
distinct user role that is represented in the database.  The class names are spelled with all 
capital letters.  A specific user role within this class is called an instance of the class.  For 
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example, ‘Certificate Authority’ is an instance of the class ‘USER ROLES’.  The 
identification of the classes is the starting point for a SOM. 
Once object classes have been determined, the attributes of these classes are 
listed.  Attributes provide further definition of a class.  Three types of attributes exist.  
Simple attributes have a single value such as date, social security number, or training 
element ID.  Group attributes are composites or groupings of other attributes.  For 
example, a group attribute ‘address’ may be a composite of ‘street’, ‘city’, ‘state’, and 
‘zip code’.  The third type, semantic object attributes, establish relationships between 
objects.  In the PKI training database SOM, the ‘USER ROLE’ object contains the object 
attribute ‘TRAINING ELEMENT’.  This indicates that there is a relationship between the 
‘USER ROLE’ object and the ‘TRAINING ELEMENT’ object.  The next step is to 
determine the nature of this relationship.  That is done by determining the minimum and 
maximum cardinality. 
Cardinality, in general, is the maximum or minimum number of elements allowed 
on each side of a binary relationship.  Minimum cardinality indicates the number of 
instances of an attribute that must exist.  This is normally 0 or 1.  If the minimum 
cardinality is 0, then the attribute is not required to have a value.  If the minimum 
cardinality is 1, the attribute must have a value for the relationship to be valid.  Maximum 
cardinality is the maximum number of instances an attribute can have in a relationship.  
This value is typically 1 or N.  If it is 1, the attribute can only have one instance.  If it is 
N, the attribute may have several values with no specified limit.  In the SOM, 
cardinalities are shown for each attribute in the format N.M.  N is the minimum 
cardinality and M is the maximum cardinality.  For example, in the ‘USER ROLE’ object 
the cardinality for the object attribute ‘TRAINING ELEMENT’ is 0.N.  This means that 
each instance of ‘USER ROLE’ may have zero to many instances of ‘TRAINING 
ELEMENT’ associated with it.  It is important to note that object attributes exist in pairs.  
The ‘TRAINING ELEMENT’ object attribute within the ‘USER ROLE’ class is coupled 
with the ‘USER ROLE’ object attribute within the ‘TRAINING ELEMENT’ class.   
A complete SOM provides a great deal of information about how a database 
should be built.  Together with the schema, the SOM can assist the developer in more 
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easily creating tables and relationships correctly.  Once the database is built, summary 
information about it can be obtained.  This information is called metadata. 
4. METADATA 
Metadata is defined as “data concerning the structure of data in a database stored 
in the data dictionary.  Metadata are used to describe tables, columns, constraints, 
indexes, and so forth” (Kroenke, 2000, p. 577).  Two tables of metadata were provided in 
Chapter V for the PKI training database.  The first is table metadata.  This lists each table, 
the number of columns (or fields) it contains, and the primary key for the table.  The 
second is field metadata.  This provides detailed information about the fields in each 
table.  This information includes the data type, length, and description of each field.   
With a schema, SOM, and metadata in hand, a great deal of information regarding 
a database is known.  Attempting to build a database prior to developing these models 
and determining the descriptions of the data items would be difficult, time consuming, 
and potentially fall short of the requirements it is being built to fulfill.  Although the 
models and techniques introduced in this appendix are only a few of the tools available, 
they can provide a solid foundation on which to build a database. 
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APPENDIX B. PROTOTYPE SCREENSHOTS 
The following figures are screenshots of the prototype that was developed as a 
proof-of-concept for the proposed DoD PKI Training Framework. 
 
Figure B.1 Login Screen 
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Figure B.2 Registration Page 
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Figure B.3 Home Page 
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Figure B.4 Training Options Page 
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Figure B.5 Training By User Role Search Page 
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Figure B.6 Training By User Role Results  
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Figure B.7 Training By Task Page with Results 
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Figure B.8 Tasks By User Role Page 
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Figure B.9 Tasks By User Role Results 
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Figure B.10 Evaluation Element Page 
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Figure B.11 Evaluation Elements Results 
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Figure B.12 Training Record Page 
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Figure B.13 Frequently Asked Questions Page 
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Figure B.14 Help Page 
 
88 
Figure B.15 Feedback Page 
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Figure B.16 Contact Page 
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